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‘Hermaphroditical Mixtures’:  Margaret Cavendish on Nature and Art1 
Susan James 
 
A striking feature of Margaret Cavendish’s natural philosophy is her insistence that 
things created by the practitioners of scientific arts such as chemistry and microscopy 
cannot rival the things to be found in nature.  These arts, she argues, ‘can put several 
parts together, or divide or disjoin them’; but they ‘cannot make those parts move or 
work so as to alter their proper figures and interior natures’ (Cavendish 1664, II.12; 
Cavendish 2001, 84). In advocating this view, Cavendish partly sets out to challenge 
experimentalists who claim to be able to transform the natural world.  Their 
aspirations, she argues, extend beyond their powers, and their conceptions of what 
they can achieve are deluded.  
At the root of this debate lie two venerable ontological problems about the 
relation between art and nature. Can the stock of natural kinds be enlarged by human 
artifice?  For example, when chemists first produced pewter or farmers began to breed 
mules, did they increase the number of kinds in existence by creating new types of 
things?  Equally, are humans able to use artifice to produce new instances of existing 
natural kinds? For example, can an alchemist create a new piece of gold by combining 
and heating various natural ingredients? Aristotle had answered these questions 
cautiously. According to his Physics, art can imitate nature, as when a painted bird 
resembles a natural one, or else perfect nature, as when a farmer helps nature along by 
planting seeds in the soil; but it cannot equal, let alone surpass her.  The painted bird 
cannot fly, and without nature’s generative powers the farmer’s efforts would be in 
vain (Aristotle 1984, II.8, 199a15-17). By Cavendish’s time, however, a more 
optimistic attitude prevailed. According to the experimentalists she criticises, the 
issue was not so much whether art could equal or surpass nature, but how, and how 
far it could do so. Some chemists claimed to be able to transform one kind of metal 
into another and even to generate new life.  At the same time, experimentalists 
inspired by the Baconian programme, including the group of investigators associated 
with the Royal Society, were convinced that not only chemistry, but a whole range of 
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experimental arts can replicate existing natural things, and sometimes create new 
kinds. ‘If any skilful servant of nature shall bring force to bear on matter’, Bacon had 
asserted, ‘and shall vex it and drive it to extremities as if with the purpose of reducing 
it to nothing, then will matter (since annihilation or true destruction is not possible 
except by the omnipotence of God), finding itself in these straits, turn and transform 
itself into strange shapes’ (Bacon 1890, 726; Weeks 2007, 134). This view of art’s 
potential is echoed, for example, in Robert Boyle’s boast that ‘If Adam were now 
alive, and should survey that great variety of man’s productions, that is to be found in 
the shops of artificers, the laboratories of chemists, and other well-furnished 
magazines of art, he would admire to see what a new world, as it were, or set of things 
has been added to the primitive creatures by the industry of his posterity’ (Boyle, 
1663).  
Cavendish opposes this conception of the power of art throughout her natural 
philosophy; but her most concentrated engagement with it is contained in her 
Observations on Experimental Philosophy and in its companion text, The Blazing 
World (Cavendish, 2003).  This first of these works aims to vindicate a more sceptical 
attitude to artifice and a greater reverence for nature by showing that some of the 
leading virtuosi of the Royal Society, including Robert Boyle, Henry Power and 
Robert Hooke, have misunderstood the implications of their own experiments.  Rather 
than surpassing nature by creating new natural kinds, or even replicating existing 
kinds by artificial means, their arts deform nature by generating ‘hermaphroditical 
mixtures’ that they mistake for natural things (Cavendish, 2001, 197-8).  
In a sophisticated intellectual milieu captivated by novelties, Cavendish’s 
outlook was liable to appear old-fashioned and under-informed.  Although, as Peter 
Dear has argued, she did not defend the Aristotelian view of the relation between art 
and nature to the letter, she must nevertheless have seemed bent on reviving its spirit 
(Dear 2007, 132); and some of the experimental scientists she attacked would no 
doubt have shared the view recently voiced by William Newman, who characterises 
Cavendish’s position as ‘a reductio ad absurdum of the arguments usually mustered 
against the chymical art’ (Newman 2005, 284). However, before we can assess her 
view, we need to know what she was trying to achieve. Cavendish does indeed set out 
to show that chemists and microscopical experimenters are unable to transform 
nature; but since her aim is not merely to discredit their claims, her critique of the 
experimental arts cannot simply be dismissed in Newman’s terms.  As well as 
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standing against prevailing opinion, Cavendish opens out an existing seventeenth-
century discussion by turning her critical gaze on to the desires and aspirations of 
artificers.  What drives chemists or microscopists to try to rival nature, she asks, and 
why do so many of them delude themselves about the extent of their achievements?   
Part of the answer lies in ordinary epistemological failings.  However, as I 
argue in this chapter, Cavendish also uncovers an erotic component of the desire to 
emulate and surpass nature’s powers, which she expresses in her description of the 
fruits of experimental art as ‘hermaphroditical mixtures’.  In addition to criticising 
experimental artificers on epistemological grounds, she shifts the terms of debate by 
offering a diagnosis of the desires that lead them to try to master nature; and in the 
long narrative that spans the Observations and Blazing World she considers how their 
desires can be satisfied. According to her account, there is nothing wrong with the 
desires themselves, which, like everything else, are part of nature. Rather, the problem 
lies in the way that artificers strive to realise them. As the Observations explains, the 
experimental sciences cannot equal nature, so that practitioners who try to exercise 
their creativity through these arts are bound to be frustrated.  However, as the Blazing 
World goes on to illustrate, nature has given us the imaginative means to create new 
things and, by doing so, to satisfy the erotic desires that underlie our efforts to surpass 
the natural world.  The art of imagining, of which Blazing World is a manifestation, 
can compensate us for the limitations of the experimental arts, and satisfy the 
misdirected desires that generate opposition between art and nature. 
In defending this interpretation, I build on a rich set of explorations, both of 
the gendered character of Cavendish’s natural philosophy (Clucas 2014; Cottegnies 
2014; Keller 1997, 450-1; Sarasohn 2010, 158-63) and of the relationship between 
Observations and Blazing World.  However, three strands of recent research are 
particularly pertinent.  First, I follow a group of authors who have observed, as Tien-
yi Chao puts it, that the principle of “nature before art” is, for Cavendish, ‘a 
fundamental principle, to be implemented in both philosophical reasoning and literary 
writing’ and is defended throughout the Observations and the Blazing World (Chao 
2012, 73).  In the latter text, I argue, Cavendish presents imagination as an integral 
aspect of nature that can make up for the limitations of the experimental arts, and 
release the practitioners of these arts from the destructive illusion that these arts can 
outdo nature.  
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My argument also resonates with Chao’s proposal that, despite Cavendish’s 
resolutely critical attitude to the alchemical tradition, she is in some ways indebted to 
it (Chao, 2009).  This is not immediately obvious.  For example, as Stephen Clucas 
has pointed out, Cavendish’s most explicit engagement with chemistry – her 
discussion of Van Helmont’s Oriatrike in her Philosophical Letters – echoes Boyle’s 
slightly earlier comments on the same author (Clucas 2011, 4). Like Boyle, she 
objects to Van Helmont’s obscure language, and questions the validity of some of his 
experiments. But whereas Boyle accepts a version of Van Helmont’s view that 
chemistry can transform nature, Cavendish reiterates her central thesis. ‘Your Author, 
being a Chymist, is much for the Art of Fire, although it is impossible for Art to work 
as Nature doth; for Art makes of natural Creatures artificial Monsters, and doth 
oftener obscure and disturb Natures ordinary actions, then prove any Truth in Nature’ 
(Cavendish 1664, III.12).  Because Cavendish repeatedly emphasizes the deficiencies 
of the chemical tradition, it is easy to overlook the extent to which it permeates her 
own outlook.  Chao seeks to redress this balance by offering an alchemical reading of 
the Blazing World. The conception of nature defended by the Empress, she contends, 
is also articulated in alchemical works by Paracelsus and Sendivogius, which 
Cavendish could in principle have read (Chao, 2009, 66-9).  I offer a different kind of 
support for this strand of interpretation by identifying another of Cavendish’s 
alchemical debts: the conception of the hermaphrodite that figures in her critique of 
experimental philosophy. Commentators have remarked on the use of this image as a 
symbol of illusion and deformity (Fox Keller, 1980), and Dear has illuminated its 
overall place in Cavendish’s philosophy.  As he points out, she construes nature as 
feminine, and thus aligns art with the masculine (Dear 2007, 133).  However, as far as 
I am aware, there is no systematic account of the role that the image plays in 
Observations and Blazing World.  By tracing its fortunes, I suggest, we can extend 
our understanding of the philosophical argument about the relation between nature 
and art that is enfolded in these texts.  
After summarizing the most relevant features of Cavendish’s ontology, I focus 
on her claim that chemists produce hermaphroditical mixtures rather than natural 
things.  I trace the source of this image and indicate how Cavendish uses it to assess 
both the achievements and the motives of practising chemists.  I then show how she 
uses a parallel range of arguments to criticize microscopy before turning to her central 
 5 
aim: that of explaining how experimental artificers can satisfy the desires that 
underlie their aspiration to create new things by turning to the art of fiction.  In the 
final section of the paper I show how Cavendish spells out this strategy in the Blazing 
World. 
Cavendish develops her critique of the experimental arts against a background 
conception of the natural world as orderly and infinitely productive.  Nature, she 
argues, is an organised whole made up of living and self-moving bodies that all 
belong to a single ontological kind and are composed of three types of matter, 
inanimate, sensitive and rational. Furthermore, nature is infinitely productive and 
delights in her own variety.  Her orderliness is reflected in the fact that the number of 
species is fixed. (All species last as long as nature does, and the human species, for 
example, ‘is as lasting as the sun, moon and stars’ (Cavendish 1668, 11, 234; 
Cavendish 2001, 132).)  But because natural motions are not entirely regular and 
allow for infinite variation, no two individuals of a given species are exactly alike, 
and things of a given kind can differ from one another in an infinite number of ways  
(Cavendish, 1668, 31).   This diversity makes it easy to misclassify things. For 
example, we may mistakenly infer that blue and white diamonds are separate 
minerals, or wonder whether black moors, ‘who seem a kind of race of men different 
from the white’, were produced by Adam (Cavendish, 2001, 115). Equally, we may 
wrongly conclude that individuals who seem to us to be monsters are unnatural, when 
in fact they are simply the result of irregular though natural motions that cause them 
to deviate from what we regard as the norm.   
A further source of confusion derives from what some of Cavendish’s 
contemporaries describe as ‘middling things’, which combine the features of two 
different species.  According to John Weemes, for example, the bat is between 
creeping things and fowls and the hermaphrodite between man and woman (Weemes, 
1632), while  Benjamin Spencer adds that mandrakes are of a middle nature between 
a plant and living creature, while amphibians are between flesh and fish (Spencer, 
1659).  Cavendish extends this list: flying fish, she claims, are part beasts and part 
fish, bats combine the properties of mice and birds, and owls those of birds and cats 
(Cavendish 1668, 164,171). But these creatures are not exceptions to nature’s rule.  
They have their own figurative motions or appearances, their own interior natures or 
capacities, and are thus natural species in their own right.  It is only because ‘man is 
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apt to judge according to what he, by his senses, perceives of the exterior parts of 
corporeal actions of objects, and not by their interior difference’ that we are 
sometimes misinterpret the ontological structure of the natural world (Cavendish, 
2001, 115). 
Alongside their diversity, natural things have certain common features, of 
which one of the most crucial is the power to reproduce ‘from the producers’ own 
parts’ (Cavendish, 1668, 233).  Natural bodies, as Cavendish conceives them, possess 
the power to alter themselves by ‘patterning out’ the figures of other bodies, as when 
the snow ‘patterns out’ the figure of the sole of a boot, or the eye patterns out the 
figure of a face.  But they also reproduce themselves through  ‘a mutual 
transformation of all figures and parts of nature’ (Cavendish 1664, III.10).  Where 
two individuals of the same species unite to generate their offspring, parents and 
children resemble one another  ‘in their interior and exterior figures’. But 
reproduction does not always conform to this pattern; ‘not everything doth always 
produce its like’, and in some cases an individual of one species generates an 
individual of another, with its own exterior form and intellectual nature  (Cavendish 
1668, 39). The production of maggots by cheese, minerals by the earth, or worms by 
fruit and flowers, not only illustrate nature’s infinite generative capacity but also 
remind us of how little we know about its interior operations.  
Cavendish’s assessment of the relation between art and nature is shaped by 
this philosophical outlook, and by an accompanying reverence for the complexity and 
variety of natural motions (Cavendish 1662, 162-3; Cavendish 1668, 29, 117; 
Detlefsen 2009, 430-4; Walters 2009, 256.).  She agrees with her opponents that art 
can mimic nature by making things that superficially resemble natural things, can 
assist nature by facilitating or speeding up natural processes of production, and can 
produce useful combinations of materials such as ships or necklaces that do not 
pretend to be natural kinds (Cavendish 2001, 84; Cavendish 1668, 39).  But when it 
comes to the question of whether art can transform a thing of one kind into a thing of 
another, or add to the existing stock of natural kinds, she parts company with them.  
While they claim that artificial processes can join distinct types of bodies ‘under a 
new form’, thus creating new kinds of things that are not merely mixtures of their 
components, but rather, as Bacon puts it, ‘properly an union’, Cavendish insists, as we 
have seen, that art can never do more than mix components (Bacon 1872,93-4).  
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This unwavering conviction is partly grounded on Cavendish’s belief that, 
because we cannot perceive the great variety of actions that are constantly occurring 
in every part of every natural creature, we cannot fully understand the inner natures of 
things. We can therefore never be sure whether things that we create really match 
their natural counterparts, and thus whether we have succeeded in replicating nature, 
whose ‘waies and originals are utterly unknown’ (Cavendish 1653, 176; Cavendish 
1664, IV.24; Cavendish 2003, 42-3).  By itself, this appeal to ignorance is weak, but it 
makes more sense when allied to Cavendish’s observations about nature’s generative 
power.  As we have seen, one of the defining features of natural things is their 
capacity to reproduce.  Here, Cavendish implies, we find a crucial difference between 
the products of nature and those of the experimental arts. While natural things 
reproduce, artefacts do not (Cavendish 1664, I.45). For example, while a farmer may 
cross a donkey with a horse to produce a mule, the mule is sterile; and while a 
chemist may make pewter by heating tin and lead, pewter is not naturally produced or 
reproduced, as Cavendish believes that minerals are. Such cases provide support for 
the generalisation that the inner natures of artefacts are not the same as those of 
natural things, so that, in this respect, art fails to imitate nature. Furthermore, the 
inability of artefacts to reproduce shows that they lack the internal unity of natural 
things and are merely artificial mixtures.  Pewter, for example, is just a mixture 
‘between tin and lead’ (Cavendish, 2001, 14), and mules mix up the properties of 
horses and donkeys without constituting a distinct species (Cavendish 2001, 232). So, 
whereas a housewife who uses milk to make cheese taps into nature’s ability to 
transform one kind of thing into another and benefits from her fecundity, a chemist 
who strives to make new metals vainly attempts to ‘enforce nature and make her go 
out of her natural pace’ by redirecting her power (Cavendish 1653, 176).  Rather than 
assisting in the creation of a natural thing, capable of playing its part in the 
reproductive cycle of nature, he produces something sterile.  
Cavendish could in principle have made the image of sexual sterility explicit.  
In fact, however, she incorporates it in the more arresting metaphor of 
hermaphroditical mixture on which we have already touched. ‘I call artificial effects 
hermaphroditical, that is partly natural and partly artificial: Natural because art cannot 
produce anything without natural matter….; but artificial because it works not after 
the way of natural productions’ (Cavendish 2001, 198). Why, though, does 
Cavendish’s argument take this turn? Her train of thought draws, I suspect, on the 
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works of Paracelsan chemists, who hold that their arts of transforming base metal into 
gold and creating living things involve the conjoining of a male and female principle, 
and attribute the power to unite the two to Mercury or Hermes.  Sometimes, Mercury 
is represented as a hermaphrodite who personifies this union; in other accounts he is 
simply the possessor of the masculine power on which it depends. In either case, he 
lends his power to chemists, endowing them with the capacity to transform one thing 
into another, whether by summoning a hermaphroditic being or Rebus, creating a 
homunculus or living man, restoring the dead to life, or transforming base metals into 
gold (Long 2006, 117).   
The various forms of transformation that chemists claim to achieve are 
therefore associated with the idea of sexual unification.  But so, too, is their own 
power, and in conceiving of themselves as conjoining male and female principles 
chemists express an underlying aspiration to unite the two that they find in a range of 
ancient myths. For example, alongside his invocations of Mercury, Paracelsus draws 
on a rabbinical interpretation of Genesis v. 2, in which Adam is represented as a 
hermaphrodite.  ‘Rabbi Jeremiah b. Leazar said:  When the Holy One, blessed be He, 
created Adam, he created him an hermaphrodite, for it is said, Male and female 
created he them and called their name Adam’ (Freedman and Simon 1934, 54; 
Almond 1999, 4-8). The philosopher’s stone, Paracelsus now infers, is both a ‘fiery 
and perfect Mercury extracted by nature and art’ and at the same time ‘the artificially 
prepared and truly hermaphrodite Adam, a reproductively self-sufficient being that 
‘copulates by itself … marries itself and conceives in itself’ (Paracelsus 1659, 51; 
Paracelsus, 1976, 67).  The stone, and by implication the chemist, are thus endowed 
with the power to unite opposing sexual principles by two hermaphroditical figures, 
Mercury and also Adam, ‘the inventor of all the arts’ (Paracelsus, 1976, 48). 
Chemistry is one of the main targets of Cavendish’s attack on the view that art 
can surpass nature, and her objections to it are sensitive to these sexual connotations.  
By criticising its experimental credentials she opens the way to a deeper exploration 
of its practitioners motivations. Echoing a widespread scepticism, Cavendish doubts 
that it is possible to create gold by artificial means and dismisses their claims on 
behalf of the philosopher’s stone as expressions of hope rather than assurance 
(Cavendish, 1664, III.13). Their experiments fail to establish that heating metals in a 
furnace can do more than rarefy them, and do not show that their techniques can 
convert one substance or form into another (Cavendish, 1664, III.5).  Equally, there is 
 9 
no good reason to suppose that they can restore the dead or create living things; what 
Paracelsus describes as a homunculus is more likely to be ‘some dregs gathered 
together into a form’, which he then ‘persuaded himself was like the shape of a man’ 
(Cavendish 1653, 176). In short, chemical art has not shown that its products are more 
than mixtures, which superficially resemble natural things but lack their inner forms.   
In describing these mixtures as hermaphroditical, Cavendish implicitly 
subverts the chemists’ sense of their own power.  While they conceive of themselves 
as endowed with the extraordinary ability to generate hermaphroditical beings in 
which male and female are seamlessly united, Cavendish represents their products as 
sexually-fragmented assortments of male and female traits.  This criticism is not 
unprecedented. According to Charles Estienne, for example, cross-breeding fruit trees 
couples two natures in one and creates a fruit that is mongrel or hermaphrodite 
(Estienne 1616).  Furthermore, as Estienne makes clear, the criticism carries 
connotations of deformity and impurity that are associated with hermaphrodites 
throughout seventeenth-century culture.  Ancient opinions, such as Aristotle’s 
contention that hermaphrodites have a male breast and nipple on the left and a female 
on one the right, are endlessly repeated, and the ‘mixed’ genitalia of those identified 
as hermaphrodites are routinely classified into four types (Paré 1634, 973; Laqueur 
1992, 135).  In the English Parnassus, Joshua Poole defines ‘hermaphrodite’ as 
‘ambiguous, promiscuous, sex-confused, mongrel, neuter, effeminate’ (Poole 1657, 
111), so that the shadow of monstrosity is never far away.  The terms is disparagingly 
applied to men who have long hair, love music, or have gentle dispositions, and to 
women who are ‘Virago-roaring girls’, fail to cover their hair, cross-dress, or occupy 
positions of authority. Unsurprisingly, the deep anxiety that these disciplinary 
strategies reveal is also reflected in the law, where hermaphrodites pose difficulties in 
relation to marriage and inheritance.  In response, legal authorities argue that anyone 
classified as a hermaphrodite must make a binding decision to ‘become’ male or 
female, ‘according to the predominance of their sex’ (Edgar 1632, 5). 
When Cavendish describes the products of chemistry as hermaphroditical 
mixtures she draws on this disturbing penumbra of meaning, in which hermaphrodites 
are portrayed as not fully male or fully female, not one thing or another, and also as 
individuals whose sexuality is concealed and thus misleading. Picking up the first 
aspect of this image, she plays on the view that the hermaphrodite stands between 
man and woman in her claim that chemical mixtures form ‘a third figure between 
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nature and art’ (Cavendish, 2001, 53).  Exploiting the second aspect, she transposes 
the supposedly deceptive appearance of the hermaphrodite on to the products of 
chemistry.  Chemists confuse mixtures with natural things, she contends, ‘as if they 
were to mistake a doll made of paste, wax and gummed silk for a living child’ 
(Cavendish, 2001, 114).  
To some extent, the chemists’ error results from ordinary mistakes such as 
inaccurate perceptions or invalid inferences.  But in Cavendish’s view it also flows 
from a deeper failure to acknowledge that chemistry itself is a hermaphroditical 
mixture, a mélange of nature and artifice. While practitioners regard it as a unified 
practice, whose power and efficacy is proved by its extraordinary ability to transform 
nature, she condemns it as a jumble of artificial or experimental techniques that are 
unsuccessfully brought to bear on natural things.  Rather than tapping into nature’s 
motions and enhancing the changes they produce, the chemists distort the natural 
things on which they work and produce artificial monsters.  Cavendish’s appeal to 
hermaphroditic mixtures therefore belongs to a subversive strategy designed to 
undermine the pretensions of chemistry by pitting one set of symbolic associations 
against another.  To discredit the Paracelsan image of the hermaphrodite who unifies 
and transcends sexual difference, she draws on a popular conception of 
hermaphroditism as a condition of unresolved incompleteness.  Far from uniting or 
transforming natural things, chemistry disorders nature.   
It is rare for a seventeenth-century writer to reject chemistry as wholeheartedly 
as Cavendish does, but many of her contemporaries shared at least some of her 
reservations.  They also doubted chemistry’s more extravagant claims, and questioned 
the explanatory power of the arcane forces to which practitioners appealed 
(Cavendish 1664, III.2, III.5.).  Cavendish’s attack was therefore part of a broader 
debate.  To a lesser extent, the same is true of her parallel critique of a second 
experimental art, namely microscopy (Wilkins, 2014, 7).  A number of authors had 
raised doubts about the validity of microscopical observations, but again, Cavendish 
carries them to unusual heights. When she contends that such ‘toyish’ investigations 
are also a hermaphroditical travesty of art, she is on relatively unfamiliar ground 
(Cavendish 1668, 294).  
Like the argument that we have traced so far, this critique has two connected 
aspects, one to do with microscopic images, the other with the art of microscopy 
itself.  Addressing the first, Cavendish starts from the widely-accepted claim that, 
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when we view an object under a microscope, we only perceive what Sydenham calls 
‘the outer husks of the things we would know’ and do not penetrate to their inner 
natures (Sydenham 1850, ii.171).   Developing her position, Cavendish next 
introduces the more troubling suggestion that microscopy may not accurately reveal 
the surfaces of things.  ‘The question’, she asserts, is ‘whether it can represent the 
exterior shapes and motions so exactly, as naturally they are’ (Cavendish 2001, 50).  
After all, objects under a microscope look different when viewed from diverse angles 
and in various lights, so that, as   Hooke had explained in the Preface to his book of 
engravings, Micrographia, he had had to combine a number of microscopic images to 
capture the ‘true forms’ of things, (Hooke 1667, f2; Keller 2009, 454). Furthermore, 
appearances vary from one lens to another. ‘A glass that is flawed, cracked or broke, 
or cut into the figure of lozenges, triangles, squares of the like, will present numerous 
pictures of one object’ (Cavendish 2001, 50).  Cavendish knew from experience that 
these microscopists have to try to surmount these familiar  obstacles, but she also goes 
on to voice a deeper reservation. When we look at a natural object through a 
microscope, she points out, we do not observe it directly: ‘it is not the body of the 
object which the glass presents’. Instead, we see an image of the object reflected 
through a lens: ‘the glass only figures or patterns out the picture presented by and in 
the glass’  (Cavendish 2001, 51). The resulting image or figure is therefore the fruit of 
mixing a natural process  - ordinary vision - with an artificial one - the interposition of 
a lens.  And in Cavendish’s view, this is enough to discredit the image itself.  It is ‘a 
hermaphroditical, that is mixt figure, partly artificial and partly natural’ (Cavendish 
2001, 50).  
By describing microscopic images in these terms, Cavendish indicates that she 
regards them, not as natural things, but rather as ontological distortions of nature’s 
operations, brought about by meddling artificers.  However, her principal objection to 
the use of lenses in philosophical investigation is epistemological (Keller 1997, 450).  
As we have seen, she is convinced that chemists have a delusory conception of their 
art. They believe they are creating new kinds of things on a par with those created by 
nature, when in fact they are only producing hermaphroditical mixtures.  
Analogously, microscopists believe that they have created an artificial form of vision, 
superior to the one with which nature has endowed us.  But this, too, is a mistake, 
because microscopic images are also only hermaphroditical mixtures.  While 
Cavendish does not go so far as to claim that all such images lack veracity -  ‘I do not 
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say that no glass presents the true picture of an object’ - she nevertheless takes 
distortion to be the rule rather than the exception (Cavendish 2001, 50).  Since optic 
glasses ‘oftentimes present falsely the picture of an exterior object’, representing its 
figure in so ‘monstrous a shape, as it may appear misshapen rather than natural’, the 
safest course is to avoid them (Cavendish 2001, 50-1).  ‘Wherefore the best optic is a 
perfect natural eye and a regular sensitive perception’ (Cavendish 2001, 53).  
Microscopists such as Power or Hooke, who ignore this advice, overreach 
themselves when they claim to know what the eye of a fly really looks like, just as 
chemists are deluded when they claim to be able to transform base metal into gold.  
Both sets of practitioners fail to recognise that their knowledge claims are the 
outcome of distorting arts that ‘blind the understanding and make the judgment 
stagger’, and are duped by their faith in artifice (Cavendish 1662, III.13).  Led on by 
desire for the kind of power that nature exercises when she creates unified natural 
kinds, experimenters comfort themselves with the fantasy that they, too, are capable 
of achieving this feat.  In doing so, they generate the illusion that art can dominate 
nature.   
In the light of this conclusion, Cavendish calls for a reconsideration of the 
ontological relation between nature and art.  Within natural philosophy, that ‘rational 
search and enquiry into the causes of natural effects’, fantasies such as the ones that 
chemists and microscopists indulge in are a serious failing, to be avoided at all costs 
(Cavendish 2003, 5).  If these experimenters are to contribute to philosophical 
enquiry, they will have to scale back their ambitions and concentrate on what they can 
soberly establish to be the case.  However, the capacity to form desires that go beyond 
our existing achievements and imagine that they are already realised is part of our 
nature; and, as we can infer from the currency and persistence of the experimental 
delusions that Cavendish has identified, it can be intensely pleasurable.  Since this 
feature of human life is a natural one and is not going to disappear, Cavendish 
contends, we need to consider how people can experience the satisfactions of 
imagining without running the risk of philosophical error.  Happily, nature has 
provided one.  By cultivating the art of fancy or fiction, a man may frame ideas ‘in his 
own mind, … without regard whether the things he fancies be really existent without 
his own mind or not’.  While ‘reason searches the depth of nature and enquires after 
the true cause of natural effects, fancy creates of its own accord whatever it pleases 
and delights in its own work’ (Cavendish 2003, 5).   
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With this reassurance, Cavendish shifts her readers’ attention away from the 
experimental arts to a materialist analysis of art in general.  All arts are part of nature 
and, when properly practised, contribute to her power to produce an infinite sequence 
of individual bodies. Furthermore, these bodies are of a single ontological type.  
Whether they are grains of sand, dandelions or human beings, they are composed of 
self-moving matter and possess to a greater or lesser degree the capacity to move in 
the various ways that constitute sensing, imagining and reasoning.  The power to 
imagine, then, is not confined to a few natural species.  On the contrary, it is 
ubiquitous, and each individual body exercises its fancy in its own fashion. Although 
we are often unable to imagine how other species imagine or what they fantasise 
about, the imaginings of minerals and plants, for example, are among the 
manifestations of nature’s infinite productivity  (Cavendish 1668, 29).  Equally, when 
we imagine, we do not go against nature or disrupt her orderly motions.  Rather, in 
accordance with the Aristotelian definition of art, we imitate nature by imagining 
objects that resemble her own creations, and perfect her by increasing her variety. 
 If, as Cavendish argues, many of the claims made by chemists and 
microscopists lack a rational foundation, they have no place in natural philosophy; 
but, as products of imagination, they fit comfortably into the art of fiction.  In a 
domain where we do not have to worry whether the objects of our fancy exist, a 
chemist can safely imagine that a mixture is, as Bacon puts it, ‘properly an union’.  
Equally, though more strangely, microscopists can imagine that they are seeing nature 
as she truly is, regardless of the presence of an optic glass.  To make this point 
explicit, Cavendish conjoins her Observations on Experimental Philosophy with the 
fictional Blazing World.  Where the Observations repudiates the claims made by 
experimenters, the Blazing World shows how they can be realised, and thus how the 
desires of their creators can be satisfied. It offers them a refuge from their inability to 
use the experimental arts to make bodies such as gold, or powers such as vision, and 
invites them to create new tokens and types in the only way that nature allows, 
through fiction. 
The young woman who becomes the Empress of the Blazing World rules over 
a country in which many of the artefacts that Cavendish’s contemporaries strive to 
produce occur naturally, so that their arts are rendered unnecessary. It contains, for 
example, ‘more gold than all the chymists ever did, and as I verily believe, ever will 
be able to make’, so that there is no need to create more by artifice (Cavendish 2003, 
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6); and it is a world where the natural vision of the creatures who inhabit the earth and 
sky surpasses anything that can be seen through a microscope or telescope.  
Cavendish also uses her fiction to bridge the gap between the mixtures that she 
accuses experimental scientists of producing and the unified individuals that they 
claim to create, by filling the Blazing World with creatures who are simultaneously 
mixtures and natural kinds.  The Empress encounters men with azure, purple, grass-
green, scarlet and orange complexions (Cavendish 2003, 17), bear-men, worm-men, 
ant-men, bird-men, fish-men and satyrs (Cavendish, 2003, 10, 18), and creatures who 
are described as intermediate, for example between flesh and fish. Viewed in one 
way, this is a playful realisation of the experimental scientists’ desires, an arena in 
which their mixtures have become the natural things they aspire to produce.  At the 
same time, it is a fictional exploration of Cavendish’s philosophical view that nature 
manifests her variety by combining qualities from two distinct species to make a 
third.  In our world, for example, an individual of one species such as a bat may 
combine features of other species such as mice and birds; but in the Blazing World 
this strategy runs riot and produces a plethora of paradoxically united mixtures. The 
distinction between mixtures and natural kinds, and between the products of art and 
those of nature, is obliterated in a fictional world that overspills the limits of our own.  
In case we should miss this point, the philosopher scientists of the Blazing 
World are themselves naturalised mixtures, who follow the professions ‘most proper 
for the nature of their species’ (Cavendish, 2003,18).  Founding a series of scientific 
societies, the Empress installs the fly-men, bear men and worm-men as her 
experimental philosophers, the fox-men as her politicians, the parrot-men as her 
orators, and so on, and interrogates each group in turn. Her conversation with the 
bear-men turns on the value of their optic glasses. Demonstrating the power of their 
microscopes, the bear men show the Empress magnified images of some of Hooke’s 
prize exhibits (a louse, the eye of a fly, a piece of charcoal, a nettle leaf), much as the 
members of the Royal Society had performed experiments for Cavendish herself. 
Throughout these experiments, however, the Empress raises a string of objections: 
that microscopes may not be true informers; that some of the inferences the bear-men 
draw from their observations are contradictory; that their art serves no practical 
purpose; and that ‘notwithstanding their great skill, industry and ingenuity in 
experimental philosophy, they could yet by no means contrive such glasses, by the 
help of which they could spy out a vacuum’ (Cavendish 2003, 31). The Empress’s 
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assessment of telescopes is initially still more critical. Claiming that they cause ‘more 
differences and divisions among [the bear-men] than ever they had before’, she 
condemns them as false informers and commands the bear-men to break them 
(Cavendish 2003, 26).  ‘Nature’, she pronounces, ‘has made your sense and reason 
more regular than art has made your glasses, for they are mere deluders, and will 
never lead you to the knowledge of truth’ (Cavendish 2003, 27-8).   
The bear-men do not try to defend the success of their optical art and merely 
express the hope that, ‘in time, by long study and practice’, they will be able to 
answer her objections (Cavendish 2003, 31). But they successfully plead to be 
allowed to keep their instruments and continue their investigations. ‘We take more 
delight’, they explain, ‘in artificial delusions than in natural truths. Besides, we shall 
want employments for our senses and subjects for arguments; for were there nothing 
but truth, and no falsehood, there would be no occasion for dispute, and by this means 
we should want the aim and pleasure of our endeavours in confuting and contradicting 
each other’ (Cavendish 2003, 28).  In the Blazing World, the optical arts do not reveal 
nature or enhance philosophical understanding.  Nevertheless, they are a source of 
pleasure and a subject of harmless disagreement. To look through a telescope or 
microscope and argue about what one has observed is like going to the theatre and 
then discussing the world of the play; one enters a practice where the unswerving 
pursuit of truth is set aside in favour of the imaginative exploration of possibilities.  
This, Cavendish implies, is what experimental philosophers are already doing, and 
through her own fiction she gives them permission to indulge themselves. 
 The compensation that Cavendish holds out to chemists, the ape-men of the 
Blazing World, is less direct.  After listening to their rambling and inconclusive 
opinions, the Empress briskly rejects their central claims; but various aspects of the 
Blazing World nevertheless validate the traditional aspirations of chemistry.  By 
imagining a realm where the qualities of gold are acknowledged to be exceptional (the 
capital city, an epitome of beauty, is built of it and the Empress’s gold ships are vital 
to the success of her military campaigns), Cavendish respects rather than disparages 
the chemists’ longing to create gold out of base metal.  At the same time, she invents 
a substitute for the philosopher’s stone; its almost-magical powers are bestowed on a 
naturally-occurring, fiery sun stone that the Empress uses to impress her subjects and 
terrify her enemies (Radley 2014, 161-3).  Finally, the Blazing World contains a gum 
(concealed in a hollow stone) with which (in a parody of the techniques described by 
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Paracelsans) the ape-men are able to rejuvenate members of the Imperial race.  
Listening to their account of this process, the Empress is initially incredulous but 
eventually convinced. ‘She would not have believed it’, she comments, ‘had it been a 
medicine prepared by art; for she knew that art, being nature’s changeling, was not 
able to produce such a powerful effect, but being the gum did grow naturally she did 
not so much scruple at it; for she knew that nature’s works are so various and 
wonderful that no particular creature is able to trace her ways’ (Cavendish, 2003, 
157).  As in Cavendish’s own world, the art of the Blazing World is only effective 
when it successfully taps into what are, in that domain, the workings of nature.  
 While the Empress gives students of optics carte blanche to pursue their arts 
and reap the pleasures of doing so, the chemists are offered a realm in which nature 
already realises many of their aspirations.  The resolution of their desires lies in the 
existence of what they have longed for, a world of unlimited gold and eternal life, 
rather than in continuing experiment.  However, as Cavendish also acknowledges, the 
satisfaction that the experimental sciences deliver also derives from the delight its 
practitioners take in their technological prowess.  The chemists’ desire to transform 
nature is partly a yearning to control the natural world and direct it to human ends. To 
satisfy this ambition, Cavendish fills the Blazing World with artificial marvels that go 
beyond the scientific achievements of her day. For example, by contrast with a real-
life but failed attempt to construct a submarine and sail it up the Thames, the Empress 
builds a whole fleet of gold ships that can ‘swim under water’ (Cavendish 2003, 192).  
The sexual aspect of the desires that Cavendish’s critiques of chemistry and 
microscopy lay bare also has its counterpart in the Blazing World.  As well as 
realising the chemists’ aspirations to transform mixtures into unified things, its 
fictional inhabitants also play out the Paracelsan desire to unite unite male and female 
principles into one.  Cavendish distances herself from Paracelsus’s  hermaphrodite 
exemplars,  Mercury and Adam; but she nevertheless offers a means to satisfy the 
desires that these figures symbolise.  Within her narrative, a fictional Duchess of 
Newcastle becomes the Empress’s counsellor, and with the help of some resourceful 
spirits the two women’s souls travel to England, where they visit the Duchess’s 
husband, the Duke of Newcastle.  Their souls enter into him, so that three souls are 
contained within his body; ‘and had there been but some such souls more, the Duke 
would have been like the Grand Signior in his seraglio, only it would have been a 
platonic seraglio’ (Cavendish 2003, 81).   Before long the souls of the Duke and 
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Empress grow enamoured of each another, and the Duchess becomes uneasy.  Only 
by considering ‘that no adultery can be committed amongst Platonic lovers’ does she 
manage to ‘cast forth of her mind the idea of jealousy’ (Cavendish 2003, 81).  One 
function of the fictional Blazing World is therefore to render safe a range of erotic 
desires.  Adultery loses it sting, a single body can house male and female souls, sex 
may be doubled or tripled in male and female combinations, and lovers may become, 
as Cavendish’s correspondent Walter Charleton expresses it, hermaphrodites but no 
monsters (Charleton 1668, 70).  In fiction, the fragmented conception of the 
hermaphrodite that dominates Cavendish’s critique of experimental philosophy is set 
aside in favour of a contrasting but also current image – the hermaphrodite as the 
symbol of sexual unification.  The delights of this union are made present in the 
conversation between the souls of the Duchess, Duke and Empress, which were, as 
we learn from the Blazing World, ‘so pleasant that it cannot be expressed’ (Cavendish 
2003, 81).  
The implication that the aspirations of the experimental arts can only be 
realised by the art of fiction is still more explicit in a further exchange between the 
Duchess and the spirits of the Blazing World.  Having acted as the Empress’s adviser, 
the Duchess forms a desire to rule a world of her own and asks the spirits to help her 
conquer one. They, however, are surprised by her request. ‘We wonder’, they tell her, 
‘that you desire to be Empress of a terrestrial world … when every creature can create 
an immaterial world fully inhabited by immaterial creatures, … and all this within the 
compass of the skull’ (Cavendish 2003, 72).  Moreover, they continue, the rulers of 
material worlds can only derive as much pleasure from them ‘as a particular creature 
is able to enjoy’; but ‘by creating a world within yourself, you may enjoy all both in 
whole and in parts … and enjoy as much pleasure and delight as a world can afford 
you’ (Cavendish 2003, 72).  Accepting this advice, the Duchess first tries to create 
imaginary worlds along the lines proposed by a string of philosophers from Thales to 
Hobbes; but she soon comes to the conclusion ‘that no patterns would do her any 
good in the framing of her world’ (Cavendish 2003, 75).  She therefore resolves to 
make a world of her own invention that, as it happens, conforms to the principles 
worked out in Cavendish’s natural philosophy.  The message is clear.   In the world of 
material bodies that philosophy struggles to understand, we cannot change the kinds 
of things that exist. Nature has not endowed us with forms of power that she alone 
possesses – the power to create new natural kinds or replicate kinds that already exist.  
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To this extent, we are subject to what the spirits describe as the ‘power and control’ of 
nature (Cavendish 2003, 72).  However, our desire for novelty is itself a natural one, 
and nature has given us a means to satisfy it.  The imaginative arts offer us a way to 
transcend the limits of physical experiment and enjoy the pleasures that the 
experimental arts  deny us (Chao 2009, 70).  
Cavendish’s attack on the arts of chemistry and microscopy appears 
conservative insofar as it holds that these arts cannot transform nature; and if this 
were all she had to say, her position would indeed be out of joint with the spirit of her 
times. In fact, however, her negative assessment of the experimental arts is only the 
beginning of her argument. Adopting the stance of a critical theorist avant la lettre, 
she enquires into the motives underlying these arts, representing them not just as 
practices that aim to create new kinds of things, but also as manifestations of a desire 
to outdo nature, sexually and otherwise.  As things stand, she contends, chemists and 
microscopists are failing to face the fact that their aspirations cannot be realised, 
because the products of their experimental arts cannot equal those of nature.  But they 
do not need to suppress this insight.  Nature has provided us with arts that allow us to 
outstrip her, by endowing us with the ability to imagine things that she has not 
created. Experimental scientists should therefore turn to the art of fiction to satisfy 
their desires.   
In offering this form of compensation, Cavendish is challenging an underlying 
assumption that the experimental arts are more powerful, consequential and 
efficacious than their imaginative counterparts.  The real creators, she claims, are not 
chemists or microscopists, who wrongly believe that they are capable of making new 
things, but the authors of poems and fancies (Sadler 1997, 69-76). At the same time, 
Cavendish offers a resolution of the supposed conflict between art and nature. As far 
as the experimental arts are concerned, there is no conflict: nature determines what art 
can do, and only nature can create new things.  Nor is there a conflict between the 
imaginative arts and nature.  These arts produce new things; but their creative power 
is part of nature.  All in all, then, there is no opposition between art and nature.  
Nature reigns supreme over all the arts and licenses the only artistic creations of 
which human beings are capable.  
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